SPECIAL CONDITION FOR VTOL AIRCRAFT - EASA's EXPLANATION

Why a Special Condition?

EASA has reviewed more than 150 VTOL project configurations, at different stages of maturity, all aiming at addressing a potentially new market. The available data shows that there are a wide variety of configurations with limited common characteristics except for a VTOL capability and distributed propulsion. Despite having design characteristics of aeroplanes, rotorcraft or both, in most cases EASA was not able to classify these new vehicles as being either a conventional aeroplane or a rotorcraft as covered by the existing certification specifications.

Applying either the certification specifications for aeroplane or for rotorcraft, depending on whether they are rather an aeroplane or rather a rotorcraft, and only adding some modifications would not ensure equal treatment. These new types of vehicles are designed to address the same new market – even though not always the same segments. However CS-23 and CS-27 have significant differences, especially in terms of system Safety Objectives and Operational aspects. EASA opinion is that it would not be fair to treat applicants differently based on the regulatory starting point (CS-23 or CS-27) as it would probably favour some configurations, thus preventing potentially innovative concepts to compete on the market.

Instead, EASA favours to use objective based certification requirements, which provide the necessary flexibility to certify innovative state-of-the-art designs and technology, to establish a common set of conditions for the certification of these new concepts. Therefore EASA developed this VTOL Special Condition extensively based on CS-23 Amendment 5, which is also largely harmonised with the FAAs Part 23, integrating elements of CS-27 and new elements where deemed appropriate. Accepted Means of Compliance (AMC) will be developed and, when considered necessary, the most significant ones may be consulted publicly.

The establishment of a common set of conditions will enable a fair competition and clarity for future potential applicants. In addition, it will enable EASA to consider all vehicles with a Certification Basis based on the VTOL Special Condition as “Special Category” aircraft. This classification will provide greater flexibility in the Operational regulatory framework by enabling to tailor requirements to this type of aircraft rather than having to use aeroplane or helicopter regulations. 

RISK & PROBABILITY

During audits and safety meetings I have often been asked ‘what are your top 5 risks?’ I have a problem with that question…

Let me start with a closer look at how the aviation industry historically quantifies ‘risk’. Once the system identifies a ‘hazard’ in the operating environment, we reach for a risk matrix of some kind – typically based on the 5 x 5 example described in ICAO Doc 9859, the Safety Management Manual. You know the one: ‘severity’ along one axis and ‘probability’ along the other.

I don’t really have a problem with the severity scale; it seems quite reasonable to imagine what the ‘worst case feasible outcome’ of the hazard could be and attach a severity in relation to the word pictures associated with the scale. But what about probability? Across the scale you will usually see 5 possible choices ranging from ‘very likely’ to ‘very unlikely’ or similar. What do they mean? If you look in the dictionary for ‘likely’ it will say something like ‘such as well might happen or be true; probable’ but that won’t mean a lot to a risk assessor. To help we tend to develop simpler word pictures to try and make the choice easier and more consistent or we might add a mathematical probability like ‘once in 10,000 flights’.

The trouble is that, once we have accepted that there is a probability of greater than zero, we need to be prepared for the outcome to happen at any time. Even if the probability is once in 10,000,000 flights, that accepts that it could occur on the next flight or the 10,000,000^th one, or anywhere in between. So for any activity that we propose to repeat indefinitely, like going flying, we must accept an inevitable occurrence whatever the probability.

Can I tell you what my ‘top 5’ risks are? No. While each of my identified hazards may have differing probabilities, they do have a probability and I don’t know which is going to happen next.

IATA SAFETY REPORT 2009

The IATA Annual Safety Report for 2009, based on worldwide accident and incident data, offered some enlightening statistics as always. Firstly, runway excursion was the most frequent accident type in 2009 and it is no coincidence that IATA is revisiting its runway excursion risk reduction toolkit - I am fortunate to be contributing to that effort and will have more on the subject later. Even more striking for me was the finding that almost a quarter of accidents were attributed in part to deficient safety management, and that 86% of those implicated the regulator for deficient safety oversight. For a start I would refer to my earlier piece on the EC List of Banned Carriers, and suggest that the EC might have a point! Secondly, what does this say for the concept of safety management systems (SMS)? The whole idea of SMS is to allow operators an element of autonomy in safety management, free to some extent of prescriptive regulatory constraints, to allow them achieve the best standard in a way that suits their operation. However, if neither the operators NOR the regulators can be trusted to maintain adequate standards of operational and corporate safety, SMS is doomed to fail. We can't let this happen because it has been proven time and again that regulatory compliance does not equal a safe operation...

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LIST OF BANNED CARRIERS

The 'Blacklist'

The EC list of banned carriers purports to safeguard EU citizens in 2 ways – one by preventing unsafe airlines from operating in Europe, and the other by listing airlines which may not operate in Europe but which EU citizens may consider using on their travels. However, there are some anomalies. For a start there is a perception (unconfirmed) that European governments regularly charter banned airlines for logistics associated with military operations, and secondly major multi-national companies (notably resource groups) often charter such carriers to move personnel in countries outside of the EU. In the latter case tragedy struck recently when several Australian business executives were killed in a crash in Africa, in an aircraft operated by a carrier which features on the list.

The intent of the blacklist is clearly a good one but what do you think about the reality?

SINGLE ENGINE IFR PUBLIC TRANSPORT

Some countries allow it - most don't. What is your opinion?