Tuesday, 31 January 2017

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE - a factor in 'Pressonitis'?

Firstly I should make it clear that I am not a psychologist, nor in the truest sense of the word am I a scientist, although as an aviator I have a broad understanding of a lot of science. My knowledge of this topic in particular comes from extensive research into why pilots were flying approaches to land - the ‘approach’ being the last part of the flight descending towards the runway - when all of the available evidence indicated that the landing could not be achieved either safely or in compliance with operating procedures. The approach trajectory was either too steep or too shallow, the aircraft was too fast or too slow or the landing gear and flaps were not in the correct configuration. Pilots’ standard operating procedures required them to execute a ‘go-around’ in such circumstances, to abandon the approach, climb away safely and start again but some were simply not complying. This ‘unstable approach’ phenomenon as it is known, has been one of the most common contributory factors in commercial aviation accidents over the last 30 years or more but the tendency to press on in spite of the evidence is not unique to pilots.

This brought me to the work of Bluma Zeigarnik, a psychologist and psychiatrist born in Lithuania at the turn of the last century. She is probably best known for studies inspired by her Professor’s observation that a waiter appeared to have a much better recollection for orders that had yet to be paid for, than those which had already been settled. The waiter’s workflow involved taking the order, delivering the food and drinks and finally taking the money, at which point the workflow would be finished. He stored the order in his memory until the customer had paid and then subconsciously dumped it. In other words an incomplete pattern of work held a much higher priority for retention in the memory than one which was effectively completed.

Zeigarnik went on to study school children learning in class and found that those who were interrupted in the course of their work remembered more, and more accurately, than those who were allowed to finish without interruption. In isolation that is interesting but doesn’t tell us a great deal. However, Zeigarnik and her successors have shown that the increased memory retention is attributable to a heightened level of cognitive arousal whilst a task is being conducted, which is replaced by a more satisfied lower arousal once the task is successfully completed. The heightened cognitive arousal was in turn attributed to a degree of discomfort that the goal may fail, discomfort that could only be assuaged by success. Nowadays we know this as the ‘Zeigarnik Effect’. To take it one step further, research suggested that humans remember bad things more clearly than they remember the good things; perhaps from a survival perspective this makes sense – we remember what has done us harm so that we can avoid it in future.


So finally, the outcome of this ‘cognitive dissonance’, the disparity between aspiration and reality during the conduct of a task, is that we humans harbour a compelling desire to complete a task once we have commenced it. This can be so compelling that we may press on although all of the indications, our instincts and maybe even our own colleagues are telling us to stop and rethink the strategy. This is what we found with the ‘unstable approaches’ continued to landing – pilots had become so focused on achieving the goal that they were able to ignore the evidence that it was failing – and it probably applies to many other aspects of professional and personal life.

Thursday, 12 January 2017

AIR CRASHES - 3 DIFFERENT THINGS – BUT ARE THEY CONNECTED?

The first of these three things I have mentioned in this blog before. I spend a lot of time taking apart fatal aviation accidents, looking for the influences and factors which came together in the unique combination that allowed each ‘accident’ to happen. In recent years one of the most common precursors to a crash is procedural non-compliance – deviation from standard operating procedures by one or more of those involved. The reasons that pilots and other professionals deviate in this way are many and often related to complex human behavioural conditions; it is worth looking at Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs for insight into some of them. Whatever the underlying reasons, prior to a crash the captain will frequently decide to do something contrary to their training and procedures, that will eventually lead to their own demise. Sadly their co-pilots often look on, aware that all is not well but saying nothing.

The second thing is ‘risk denial’; maybe I have raised it in earlier posts. This is a condition that arises when we are regularly exposed to a particular, perhaps severe, hazard but it never actually does us any harm. Over time we may subconsciously adopt a mind-set that whilst the severity could be very high, the probability or likelihood is so low that it can be disregarded. Imagine passing a heavy truck in the opposite direction on a narrow lane – the obvious action would be to slow down and pull in to the side of the road to let it pass safely but every time you have passed a truck no harm has come of it. So you are able to ‘deny’ the risk, despite its blatancy, and drive on as normal with a metre or less between you and death.


So here is the final thing and I wonder if there is a connection between the three? Modern movies, TV shows and most significantly computer games allow us to experience horrifically dangerous and deadly situations without suffering any (other than perhaps psychological) harm. Could that have led to a general conditioning of westernised humanity (including pilots) to be able to subconsciously ignore hazards and adopt risky behaviours on the assumption that we will come to no harm however bad things look? After all, passengers now routinely collect their baggage before evacuating an aircraft, despite the high risk of fire and explosion. I don’t know…

Tuesday, 25 October 2016

WHY NOT DEBRIEF?

After every mission military pilots and their crew will hold a debrief to discuss want went well and what could have been done better. This is an opportunity for those involved in the task to recognise superior performance and to learn by addressing any deficiencies – makes sense right?

However, post-flight debriefs in commercial aviation are quite rare, in spite of the obvious potential value. In many regulatory jurisdictions pilots and cabin crew are only considered to be ‘on duty’ until 30 minutes after ‘on-chocks’ time so there is a limited window of opportunity. Furthermore, the crew for the next scheduled flight will frequently be waiting to get on board to maximise preparation time during the short turnaround period. Perhaps most influential is the fact that it isn’t ‘the way we do things around here’ – it’s not part of the culture.

A pilot would think nothing of remarking on a colleague’s smooth landing in difficult crosswind conditions for example but there is unlikely to be much discussion about it if it went less well. The absence of a debrief effectively implies that the entire flight proceeded satisfactorily and in accordance with standard operating procedures: there were no errors, deviations, distractions and consequently no opportunities to learn. Any pilot knows that is never the case but without a professional conversation immediately afterwards, the implication becomes reinforced.


Pilots are well used to debriefs after training flights so why not after every flight?

MORE ON CULTURE

'Culture', a term we hear used a lot in aviation these days; organisational culture, reporting culture, safety culture, just culture... You name it, there's an applicable culture. But what does it mean?

If you look it up in a dictionary it will say something like 'common behaviours and beliefs shared by a group', and offer examples such as youth culture or drug culture. Alternatively you might hear it described as 'the way we do things around here'. These definitions imply that everyone in a group does certain things the same way, so how does that happen?

An example that comes to mind relates to the flashing of car headlights. Here in my native England, if someone else flashes their headlights at me I understand it to mean 'go ahead', and so does just about everyone else. However, I spent 17 years resident in Dubai, UAE, where flashing headlights means (emphatically) 'get out of my way!' One step further, if you are lucky enough to experience the joy of driving in Nairobi, Kenya, you will find a more complex flash-code. One long flash equates to 'don't go there', whereas two short flashes means 'please go ahead'.


Now nowhere are these 'languages' written down but you can see that failure to assimilate them quickly could result in an unpleasant outcome - we humans are fast learners when it comes to survival. That is the way they do things around here and so we will do it too. An important lesson in culture; we tend to emulate those around us, whether we think it is right or wrong.

As a post script it is worth considering the likelihood of misunderstandings as a result of modern automatic headlight systems.

Tuesday, 6 September 2016

PILOTS MUST THINK LIKE THEIR AEROPLANES...

So the preliminary findings of the investigation into the Boeing 777 that crashed on landing in Dubai in August are that the pilots touched down ‘long’ and elected to initiate a ‘baulked landing’ manoeuvre, presumably to reduce the risk of an overrun. Baulked landing is very similar to a go-around – press the TOGA (take-off/go-around) switches to automatically increase thrust (the 777 has two levels of thrust response depending on the number of presses), partly retract the flap and once climb is established raise the gear. However, with wheels on the ground the TOGA switch thrust response is inhibited so for a baulked landing the pilots must advance the throttles manually. A subtle but crucial difference, which if not practiced regularly, may be overlooked in the heat of the moment.

Automation has all sorts of benefits in modern aircraft but due to the very wide range of operating environments and manoeuvres, it has different regimes of logic for different phases of flight. If these regimes are not fully understood, together with the conditions that bring about the transition from one to another, then the automation and hence the aircraft, may not respond as expected. This is not unique to Boeing and Airbus aircraft have suffered accidents for similar reasons. Today’s pilots must learn to ‘think like their aeroplane thinks’…


Monday, 5 September 2016

HEALTH-CHECK YOUR SAFETY CULTURE

This is a bit of fun but it also has a serious side - give it a try and see how your organisation fares. We put it together to give you the opportunity for a bit of honest self-analysis of the culture with regard to safety and risk in your business. It doesn't purport to be a comprehensive analysis but it should give you an insight into how things are going.

If you come out with a score of 15 - 17 things are probably going pretty well but less than 10 could indicate that you have some systemic cultural and/or organisational safety issues which need to be addressed. At Gates Aviation we have a collaborative and realistic approach to resolving these issues without turning the business on its head. Give Sean Gates a call on +44 (0)207 4696437 or e-mail sgates@gatesaviation.com .

ORGANISATIONAL SAFETY CULTURE HEALTH CHECK
Score 1 for ‘True’, 0.5 for ‘Part true’ and 0 for ‘False’
Statement
True
Part true
False
Score
The organisation has a clear safety policy:
There is a policy statement with respect to safety and risk, that is written in simple and clear language, agreed by senior management and signed by the CEO/MD/Accountable Manager




The safety policy reflects reality:
The terms of the policy reflect the genuine intent of the organisation’s management with regard to the safety of people, property and the environment




The organisation has clear safety objectives:
There are a number of clearly stated and generally SMART safety objectives (2-6), which reflect the specific goals of the organisation with regard to safety and risk




The safety objectives directly support the safety policy:
There is a recognisable link between the goals stated in the safety objectives and the intent implicit in the safety policy




Safety activities and initiatives directly support the objectives:
The allocation of resources, the activities of the safety department and the safety initiatives of the organisation demonstrably support the objectives




The safety objectives are widely known and understood:
Most personnel, especially those in front line safety critical roles, can articulate at least the intent of the safety objectives




The safety objectives have meaningful performance indicators:
Each safety objective has one or more metric or performance indicator (SPI), which genuinely measures the organisation’s progress with respect to that objective




The performance indicators have valid targets:
The organisation has defined realistic and achievable targets for each SPI, and there is a process to review the targets regularly




Performance in relation to targets is regularly reviewed:
Senior management has a process to review safety performance as indicated by the SPIs and the achievement of targets




Failure to meet a performance target is examined at senior level:
Failure to meet a performance target in the allocated time is analysed by senior management and the reasons for failure identified and addressed




Safety performance data is shared throughout the organisation:
Safety performance as indicated by the SPIs and targets is disseminated to all personnel in an appropriate and understandable format




Reporting of safety incidents and accidents is a requirement:
All personnel have an explicit and contractual obligation to report safety incidents and accidents via an established safety reporting programme




Reporting of hazards and near-misses is encouraged:
Personnel understand what constitutes a hazard and a near-miss in safety terms and are positively encouraged to report them




Incidents, accidents, hazards and near-misses are investigated:
There is a documented process to ensure that reported safety issues receive an appropriate level of investigation by trained safety investigators




Reporters are treated fairly:
Originators of safety reports are treated in a fair and consistent manner, are assured of an appropriate degree of confidentiality, and always receive acknowledgement and feedback




Acceptable and unacceptable behaviours are clearly defined:
There are documented definitions of what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behaviour with regard to safety and risk




Disciplinary processes are clear and consistent:
The consequences for an individual found to have behaved in an unacceptable manner with regard to safety and risk are clearly defined and always consistent




Total score:

Monday, 1 August 2016

SAFETY & SECURITY AUDIT IN A HIGH RISK LOCATION

The following is a 'guest post' from my Gates Aviation colleague John Edwards:

I have recently completed a risk assessment of the safety and security of an airline's crews, engineers and aircraft while operating in a high risk environment during the period of a proposed wet lease. The 'donor' airline was registered in a state that has, and the airline itself has embraced, a relatively high level of risk aversion.

 It is well known that there has been a longstanding history of terrorist attacks against commercial (and military) aviation in the location where the personnel and aircraft would be based and that numerous fatalities have resulted.

 The state authorities advise that that "all foreigners, may not move out of their city of residence without proper security and without prior coordination with the law enforcement agency". The approach taken to providing security in civilian life, especially in relation to what might be considered 'soft targets' e.g. selected public highways and shopping malls, was evident and likely to aid deterrence and detection (of terrorists and planned attacks). There was meaningful evidence to suggest efforts had been taken to harden these (previously soft) targets and protect the related communities.

 Security had been tightened at the state's international airports following a number of terrorist attacks in 2014 and further strengthened in 2015. A historic ban of locally registered airlines from operating into the EU for safety reasons had been lifted in 2015. ICAO and the USA consider that implementation of ICAO aviation safety standards in the state to exceed the global average. The airline with which the wet lease was proposed, is a member of IATA and therefore when last audited met the requirements of IOSA. Viewed in combination these facts provided evidence that the national aviation security and safety culture and infrastructure are widely considered to be sound. The main roads between the airports and hotels feature multiple manned checkpoints and the hotels where the crews and engineers were most likely to be staying, had robust security measures in place. The better quality shopping malls had entry search points operated by the military or other government agencies. It is known that places of worship and large public gatherings should be avoided and that periods leading-up to political elections can see increased civil tension and unrest. As in most business sectors and risk management environments, there was scope for continuous improvement to aviation security processes and procedures and implementation of best practices. But I considered existing measures to be relevant, adequate and sound. Accordingly, I concluded that subject to these measures being maintained, to the threat level not being raised to 'red' (the highest level) and to good situational awareness being exercised by operational personnel from the donor airline, when they are on site, the wet lease should not materially increase risk exposure. My assessment was that there are no substantive safety or security reasons why the proposed wet lease should not proceed as planned.